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Abstract 
Globally, there was a dramatic and disproportionate 
increase in caseloads in the second half of the twentieth 
century due to the expansion of human rights 
jurisprudence and legal awareness among citizens.  This 
in turn, affected the quality of justice in the Apex Court of 
every country involved in the process of constitutional 
review.  It was found that there cannot be any 
generalization in designing a Constitutional Court and it 
all depended on the constitutional and legal history of 
that particular nation. In many countries, the legislature 
and executive brought timely reforms to keep the Apex 
Court free from backlogs, but some countries, even today, 
are reeling under the pressure of unresolved cases.  India 
is one among them and of late, the discussion about the 
National Court of Appeal (NCA) as a solution to this 
problem has gained momentum.   This paper analyses the 
feasibility of establishing the NCA, along with measures 
that can be adopted by India, in tackling the mounting 
arrears of cases in Courts, following the American model 
of review such as U.S., Canada, Japan, and Brazil. 
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I.  Introduction 
The litigation explosion is the biggest problem faced by all the 
courts (from Lowest to Highest Court) in many countries. The 
steady growth of caseload affects the quality of judicial services, 
such as delay in disposing off the cases and the manner of 
adjudication.  The problem of growing caseload poses a great 
challenge to the Apex Court of different countries, and 
simultaneously, they are also adopting various strategies and 
measures to adjust with the situation1. The general presumption is 
that the specialized Courts, meant for constitutional adjudication, 
have no control over its dockets, but the Courts in diffused model 
exercising the power of judicial review, have the substantial power 
of docket control.  This presumption seems to be true because the 
Apex Court of various countries has a discretionary docket, and 
only a few have a mandatory docket.  The decision not to hear a 
case can be more harmless than hearing it.  Further, if a Court 
decides many cases, then the decision will be less convincing, i.e., 
quantity is inversely proportional to quality2.  In this regard, the 
functioning of the Indian Supreme Court and its docket control has 
been very abysmal since the 1960s.  The Supreme Court of India, 
following the American model of constitutional review, is heavily 
burdened with cases ranging from high profile constitutional 
matters to sundry appeals under different appellate jurisdictions. 
The total backlog in the Supreme Court as on Nov. 01, 2017 was 
55,259, which includes Constitution Bench matters3.  The National 
Court of Appeal (“NCA”) has been proposed to revamp the 
structure of the Supreme Court in such a way so as to reduce the 
backlogs and make the appellate Court litigant friendly.  As per the 
proposal, the NCA acts as a final appellate Court for civil and 
criminal matters, whereas, the Supreme Court acts as a 
                                                          
1 HECTOR FIX-FIERRO, COURTS, JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY – A 
SOCIO-LEGAL STUDY OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN 
ADJUDICATION 9-10 (2003). 
2 David Fontana, Docket Control and the success of constitutional courts, in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624, 631 (Tom Ginsburg and 
Rosalind Dixon eds. 2011). 
3 Seehttp://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/statistics (last visited Nov. 6, 
2017). 
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Constitutional Court hearing Constitutional matters and issues 
related to public importance. However, the matter relating to the 
establishment of NCA is pending before the Supreme Court‟s 
Constitution Bench.  Undoubtedly, if an institution is functioning 
amidst great stress and strain, it is indispensable to compare it with 
other similar systems.  Thus, this paper is a descriptive study and 
adopts the comparative law approach to analyze the structure and 
functioning of the few Apex Courts of the diffused model.  It is a 
fact-finding investigation, so it aims to throw light on the unique 
features of the Courts dealing with constitutional review. It will 
also pave the way for reforming the Supreme Court of India and 
analyze whether it is feasible to adopt the NCA as an intermediate 
Court between the Supreme Court and the High Court.  
II. Models of Constitutional Courts 
Constitutional Courts have different dimensions, and it varies 
according to the social and political structure of that State. The 
varied dimensions are: (1) Jurisdiction and powers; (2) Parties who 
have access to those Courts; (3) Mode of appointment of Judges 
and their tenure; (4) The effect of unconstitutionality; (5) Amending 
the Constitution to dilute the effect of the Constitutional Court 
decisions. 
The primary task of a Constitutional Court is judicial review.  
Judicial Review has spread across the globe through three waves4.  
The first wave was that of the United States, although the concept 
of judicial review was initiated in the United Kingdom through Dr. 
Bonham’s case5.  Sir Edward Coke, the Chief Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas sows the seed for the birth of judicial review in 
U.K., where there is no written Constitution and Parliament is 
supreme.  It was held that the legislation passed by the English 
Parliament is subordinate to the common law decisions made by 
trial and appellate court judges and any Statute contrary to 
„common right and reason‟ must be declared void.  However, this 
                                                          
4 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES – 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 90 (2003). 
5 In Thomas Bonham v. College of Physicians, [77 Eng. Rep. 638] (1610). 




principle could not gain root in the U.K. soil and has been 
decisively rejected.  
The United States Supreme Court is the precedent setter in 
recognizing as well as establishing the concept of judicial review in 
the Constitutional system6.  They utilized this doctrine to keep the 
organs of the Government and the federating States within their 
ambit and powers.  Nevertheless, later it was extended to enforce 
human rights through the Bill of Rights7.  The American model of 
constitutional review is exercised using ordinary judicial hierarchy, 
with a single Supreme Court at the apex8.  Some States such as 
Canada, Australia, Japan, and India have followed the American 
model of Constitutional Court.  Although judicial review was 
adopted by a couple of European politics like Norway and Finland, 
it gained momentum only after Hans Kelsenre conceptualized the 
constitutional review in the early twentieth century. This is termed 
as the second wave of judicial review and it spread broadly only 
after Second World War9.  It is evident that many nations in Europe 
devised a Court similar to the Court designed by Hans Kelsen10.  
The third wave of judicial review has been the most recent 
adoption of judicial review in the post-communist World and other 
new democracies.  The communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe have developed a similar structure and it was soon 
followed by some southeast Communist Asian countries.  
However, the structure of these Courts, as well as functions, did 
not reflect as adequately as intended by Kelsen.  Anyhow, the 
application of Kelsenian model in each country had confirmed to 
local situations.  The three waves have been categorized into two 
main broad categories (1) American System of Constitutional 
Courts (Diffused Model) and (2) European System (Kelsenian 
Model).   
                                                          
6 MAURO CAPPELLETTI AND WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (1979). 
7 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
8 WATER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY – CREATING 
AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 262 (2007). 
9 Id. at 263. 
10 Victor Ferreres Comella, The European model of Constitutional Review of 
Legislation: Toward Decentralization?, 2(3) I.CON. 461, 462 (2004). 
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II.I. Diffused Model of Review 
This model is also referred to as the American model.  The 
Supreme Court of United States is a self-created Constitutional 
Court.  As mentioned earlier, judicial review in U.S. was 
established through judicial dictum and the Supreme Court is 
empowered to nullify any legislation or executive action to the 
extent that it is inconsistent with the Constitution11.It acts as a 
Constitutional Court as well as an ordinary Court that resolves 
disputes.  The Court under this model is diffused in its structure, 
which means that the ordinary Courts can engage in judicial 
review, i.e., they can declare any Statute as unconstitutional, and 
there is no specialized Court exclusively to deal with constitutional 
adjudication and review.  With respect to the application of judicial 
review, it is posteriori, i.e., Ex Post review.  Courts can exercise 
judicial review after an act has been implemented or taken effect.  
The judicial review occurs only in real cases or controversies, i.e., 
Concrete Review.  Litigants, who are engaged in a real case or 
controversy, bring disputes for determination to Courts only when 
they have a personal and real stake in the outcome12.  Many 
countries which follow American system of constitutional review 
are facing the problem of docket explosion, and India is being one 
among them13. 
III. Continental Model of Review 
It is otherwise known as Austrian model or Kelsenian model.  
Many European nations followed this model and created 
Constitutional Court according to their needs.  After the advent of 
judicial review in the U.S. by the eventual creation of its Supreme 
Court, many Constitutions have drawn this idea by expressly 
providing the power of judicial review14. Hans Kelsen created a 
Constitutional Court for Austria‟s second Republic in the year 
                                                          
11 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
12 Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1017, 1033-38 (1970). 
13 Id.at 1019. 
14 Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 
274, 251-274 (2004). 




192015.  He argued that the legal system needs a Constitution to 
serve as a higher law enforceable only by a „Court-like‟ body.  
Under his theory, the Judges of regular Courts are directed to apply 
the law passed by the Parliament, and consequently, they are 
subordinate to the political institution.  Due to a strict hierarchy of 
laws, constitutional review is unsuitable to the work of an ordinary 
Court.  Hence, only an extrajudicial organ can effectively discharge 
the power of constitutional review.  The body, conventionally 
called as „Constitutional Court‟, operates as a negative legislator16. 
After the Second World War, the Constitutional Court spread 
throughout the Europe very quickly.  It sometimes acts as a 
positive legislator, either as a counterweight against the 
parliamentary majority or as a substitute if no majority exists for 
any party in the Parliament17.  It also depends on the country‟s 
political structure. Thus, Kelsenian type Courts exercising 
constitutional review can be found in most civil law countries of 
the European Union, with the Netherlands and Scandinavian 
countries as exceptions18. The primary characteristics of the 
European system of Constitutional Courts are: it is centralized, i.e., 
only a single Court, generally called as „Constitutional Court‟ and 
can exercise constitutional review.  Other Courts are barred from 
applying it, but they can refer the constitutional questions to the 
Constitutional Court.  The constitutional review occurs as „A Priori‟ 
(sometimes called Ex Ante) and „A Posteriori‟, even in some cases, 
both.  They exercise abstract and concrete constitutional review, 
i.e., most Constitutional Courts can use the review in the absence of 
a real case or controversy.   Further, the Court is not confined only 
to the citizen who has become a litigant.  It is open to governmental 
actors, including executives and members of the legislature, who 
can approach the Court for clarification of constitutional doubts19.   
                                                          
15 Comella, Supra note 10, at 461. 
16  The notion of a „negative legislator‟ as defined by Kelsen as „one who 
cannot make law freely because the Constitution determines the decision 
making.‟ [ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 34 (2000)]. 
17 Id. at 27. 
18 Comella, Supra note 10.  
19 Cappelletti,Supra note 12, at 1045-1051. 
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IV. Countries that have adopted the American Model 
There are certain Courts which adopt the American model of 
constitutional review and interpretation.  They hear constitutional 
matters brought to them as lawsuits, although they differ in 
structure, jurisdiction, and mode of appointment of judges.  The 
docket explosion is not confined to a particular legal system and is 
found both in common and continental legal systems as well as 
Constitutions with unitary or federal features.  Hence the 
researcher has chosen few Apex Courts in different legal systems, 
which follow the American model of review, to analyze the 
litigation explosion and measures adopted in combating it.  It is 
indispensable to discuss the Supreme Court of United States of 
America, since the doctrine of constitutional review was 
established through it in the federal Constitutional system.  The 
State of Japan has a unitary feature with constitutional monarchy, 
and its laws have been initially based on the Civil Law of Germany 
and France.  Nonetheless, after the World War II, the country‟s 
legal system drastically changed based on American Legal System.  
It has a blend of Continental and Anglo-American Legal system20.  
Like India, the Japanese Constitution was drafted just after the 
Second World War, and the powers and functions of the Supreme 
Court are based on the American model.   Brazil is a civil law 
country with federal Constitution.  Like India, Brazil also faces 
docket explosion in the Apex court due to its size and population.  
Thus, the researcher would like to analyze the docket explosion 
and control thereof in the Apex Court of the above-mentioned 
States covering the different Constitutional and legal systems. 
IV.1 The Supreme Court of USA 
The Supreme Court of United States has two primary jurisdictions: 
original and appellate21.  Unlike India, it precludes from tendering 
advisory opinions even at the request of the president and on every 
form of pronouncement on abstract, contingent, or hypothetical 
                                                          
20 Takaaki Hattori, The Role of the Supreme Court of Japan in the field of 
Judicial Administration, 60 WASH. L. REV. 69, 71-73 (1985). 
21 U.S. CONST. art.III, §1.  




issues22.  In consonance with the Constitutional provisions, the 
Congress provides that the Supreme Court shall have both original 
and exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies between two or 
more States. It has original and exclusive jurisdiction in all actions 
or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, 
consuls, or vice consuls of foreign States are parties. Additionally, it 
entertains all controversies between the United States and a State 
and all actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of 
another State or aliens.  It is evident from the words of the 
provision that controversies in which a State shall be a party, are 
broad enough to include suits brought by individuals against their 
State or another State.  Appeals also arise from the decision of the 
State High Courts and other federal Courts, certification, and 
petitions for writ of certiorari, but they are all subject to regulation 
by the Congress23.  It has no appellate jurisdiction in ordinary civil 
and criminal cases, and its jurisdiction is confined to constitutional 
matters24.  The appellate jurisdiction is regulated by the Judiciary 
Act, 1925.  Besides these appeals, the Supreme Court may by 
issuing the writ of certiorari, bring up cases from the State Courts in 
specified cases but will not interfere with the decision of the State 
Courts relating to non-federal matters25.  The Writ of certiorari 
mounts on the Court‟s docket and Craig R Ducat observed that the 
Congress had converted the Supreme Court into virtually an all 
certiorari-tribunal26.  Moreover, the Constitution provides power to 
the Congress to modify the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court but not the original jurisdiction.  The judicial power of the 
Supreme Court has been extended to review all cases but confined 
only to legal issues and not a political question. 
                                                          
22 MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – POWERS AND 
LIBERTIES 70 (2nd ed. 2005). 
23 U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl.2.    
24 5 DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
INDIA 5675 (8th ed. 2009). 
25 Id. at 5651-5652. 
26 CRAIG R DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 30 (8th ed. 
2002). 
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The Supreme Court sits en banc, i.e., all the judges decide a case by 
sitting together27.  The Court is open to the Public to witness the 
proceedings.  However, behind the doors refers to the discussions, 
exchanges of views by memoranda and the drafting that precedes 
the judgments, which is called „The Supreme Court‟s conference‟28.  
It has been pointed out that the conference of the Supreme Court is 
secret.  However, the Court‟s work in public sessions does not get 
affected in anyway due to the closed meetings. The public records 
of the Court contain the details of the disposal of each petition or 
application in every single case presented to the Court29.  By law, 
the term of the Court starts on the first Monday in October of every 
year and continues till the first Monday in October of the next year. 
Approximately 7000-8000 new cases are filed with the Court every 
term. This was substantially larger than the filing four decades ago.  
In 1975 term, the Court received only 3,940 cases30.   
The U.S. Supreme Court has a greater degree of control over its 
docket, but it is not so in the late 19th century. When it started 
functioning in 1789, it had a limited number of cases at its disposal.  
The normal hearing was just 24 cases a year between 1801 and 1806, 
and it remained controllable till the 1850s31.  After the civil war, the 
Court went into distressing years because of increasing backlog, 
fuelled by a growing population and active reconstruction of the 
federal government and legislation enlarging the Court‟s 
jurisdiction32.  It had a backlog of 1816 cases in the year 1890, with 
623 cases filed with the Court, and it was expected that it would 
take three to four years to clear, subject to no new cases being 
                                                          
27 Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of 
Government, in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 19, 21 (Mark W. Cannon and 
David M. O‟Brien).  
28 Id. 
29 William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court’s Conference, in VIEWS FROM 
THE BENCH 75, 75 (Mark W. Cannon and David M. O‟Brien). 
30 Seehttps://www.supremecourt.gov/about/courtatwork.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2017). 
31 Felix Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States – 
A Study in the Federal Judiciary II. From the Civil War to the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals Act, 39 HARV. L. REV. 35, 81 (1925). 
32 Willam Strong, The Needs of the Supreme Court, 132 N. AM. REV. 437 
(1881). 




filed33.  It is notable that every case filed before the Court was heard 
until the end of the 19th century because the Judiciary Act, 1789 
provides the „writ of error‟, where the Court has to hear all these 
appeals that come under it.  The Judiciary Act of 1891 created a 
court of appeals in each circuit and relieved the justices from circuit 
riding duties and gave the Supreme Court discretionary powers in 
hearing cases.  The replacement of „writ of certiorari‟ for „writ of 
error‟ had an immediate effect.  By 1892, the number of petitions 
drastically reduced to just 275, which is over half the previous 
year‟s docket34.  However, the broad jurisdiction under „writ of 
certiorari‟ made the number of cases mount up in the Court again.  
The Judiciary Act authorized the Supreme Court to decline to 
review cases where a State Court had refused a federal claim35.   
The Judiciary Act, 1925 helped the Court to gain control over its 
docket by allowing the filing of petitions for „writ of certiorari‟ with 
the grant of leave by the courts of appeals36.  Although the Court 
receives around 8,000 cases every term, it hears an average of 150 
cases both with and without plenary review37.The other important 
aspect is the Court‟s internal administration.  The petition of „writ 
of certiorari‟ was taken up for hearing after scrutinized and 
recommended by the United States justices‟ law clerks, who are 
graduated from law school just a few years before.  It is termed to 
be a „junior court‟ over certiorari petitions38.  Further, a vote of four 
out of nine justices is required to hear a case.  The Court can just 
deny any case from hearing without adducing reasons or 
explanations.  The accepted cases will be allowed to argue within 
exactly half an hour allocated to each side.  A white light signals an 
arguing attorney reminding him the last five minutes and the time 
                                                          
33 RUSSELL WHEELER AND CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 16 (1994). 
34 Frankfurter, Supra note 31. 
35 Jonathan Sternberg, Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925 and 
the Discretionary Court, 33[J] S. CT. HIST. 1, 7 (2008). 
36 Id. at 12. 
37Supra note 30. 
38 ARTEMUS WARD AND DAVID WEIDEN, SORCERERS‟ 
APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 23 (2007). 
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is up when it turns red.  Thus, the argument is strictly controlled39.  
Recently, they framed a rule making the electronic filing system 
mandatory with exemptions for certain cases, which has been in 
operation since Nov. 13, 2017.  This new system will enable the 
public and legal community to access all documents of new cases 
without any cost40. 
IV.2  The Supreme Court of Japan  
The Constitution of Japan with a unitary system of Government 
vests the whole judicial power in the Supreme Court.  It is the 
highest court in the land and is composed of fifteen justices.  It 
functions like U.S. Supreme Court but is structurally different as it 
sits in fragmented Benches.  The Court consists of fifteen Justices, at 
times, the Grand Bench includes en banc or by one of the three Petty 
Benches, each composed of five Justices. Nine or more Justices of 
the Grand Bench and three or more Justices on each Petty Bench 
constitute a quorum to decide any cases.  It has original jurisdiction 
in the matters of impeachment of commissioners of the National 
Personnel Authority.  It has final appellate jurisdiction against a 
decision as provided specifically in the codes of procedure.  An 
appeal can lie to the Supreme Court in the following circumstances: 
(1) an appeal can be filed against the decision in a civil matter or a 
domestic relations case on the ground either on the constitutional 
violations or with the leave of the High Court when the Court 
deems fit that the case involve an significant issue concerning the 
interpretation of laws and regulations, and (2) a special appeal can 
be filed on the grounds of constitutional violation or if it conflicts 
with judicial precedents against an order in a criminal case to 
which no ordinary appeal is permitted in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure or an appeal filed against an order of an intermediate 
appellate court in a juvenile case. 
In civil and administrative cases, the conclusive reasons which are 
mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure for lodging a final appeal 
                                                          
39 Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the 
Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts, 61, AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 192 (WINTER 
2013). 
40See https:// www.supremecourt.gov/ filingandrules/ electronicfiling 
.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). 




to the Supreme Court are either on the grounds of violation of 
constitutional provisions or grave procedural impropriety by the 
lower Courts.  However, the Supreme Court may entertain a case 
as a final Court of appeal when it opines that the issue is significant 
and involves interpretation of laws and regulations.  It entertains 
criminal cases also, if there is any violation of the Constitution or if 
the Court deems fit that it involves any grounds, which is similar to 
the civil and administrative cases mentioned above. The primary 
duty of the Supreme Court is to determine the question of law and 
dispenses justice after the thorough scrutiny of all documents.  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may dismiss an appeal for want of 
sufficient grounds, even without proceeding to oral arguments. In 
any case, if one of the three Petty Benches finds that the case 
involves a constitutional issue, i.e., Constitutionality of any law, 
order, rule, or disposition - it shall refer the matter to Grand Bench 
subject to the absence of precedent.  In addition to the power of 
judicial review, the Supreme Court is the highest authority of 
judicial administration. It is empowered with the management of 
judicial affairs by prescribing the rules of judicial procedure, the 
internal discipline of the Courts, and the matters connected with 
the attorneys. However, they can do only after the Judicial 
Assembly deliberates and approves the proposed rules formulated 
by the Committee‟s report41. 
Like India, the Japanese Supreme Court acts both as a 
Constitutional Court and a court of the last resort for ordinary 
appeals.  It did not exercise considerable control over its docket till 
1998.  The aggrieved parties‟ have a right to second appeal to the 
Supreme Court and it extends to all cases.  However, it is subject to 
a certificate from a High Court.  However, the right to appeal to the 
Supreme Court was restricted through the amendment in the Civil 
Procedure Code in 199842.   Before this amendment, the Supreme 
Court handled approximately over 4000 cases each year, and in 
1995, it heard around 3500 cases.  It is because of the lack of 
discretionary control over appeals in civil matters and extensive 
                                                          
41Seehttp://www.courts.go.jp/english/judicial_sys/Court_System_of_Ja
pan/index.html#02 (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). 
42 LAWRENCE W. BEER AND HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, 66 (1996). 
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appeal rights to the litigants, which results in little or no control 
over its docket.  The amendment in the Civil Procedure Code 
retains the right to appeal in certain constitutional cases and in 
cases involving procedural errors as set out in the Code.  Other 
appeals are discretionary with the Supreme Court.  Since 1998, the 
Japanese Supreme Court exercises some control over its docket and 
able to reduce the number of cases.  In 2002, it was accepted and 
rendered its opinion only in 85 cases and declined to review 2300 
cases43.  The Court is not in complete control over its docket 
because the High Courts may certify some classes of cases to be 
heard on appeal by the Supreme Court44.  Thus, the extensive 
appeal rights resulting in flooding of cases in the Supreme Court. 
IV.3  The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil  
Brazilian Constitution was adopted in the year 1988 after twenty-
one years of military rule.  The Supremo Tribunal Federal or 
Supreme Federal Court is the highest body of the judicial branch.  
The Constitution endowed the Supreme Federal Court (SFC) to 
conduct judicial review with a high level of independence.  The 
design and organization of the Brazilian constitutional adjudication 
has a combination of both abstract and concrete models of judicial 
review.  It has original jurisdiction of centralized judicial review 
and has the final jurisdiction of the decentralized system of 
constitutional adjudication.  Nowadays, constitutional adjudication 
has been characterized with the aim of testing the constitutionality 
of governmental actions and to ensure protection of fundamental 
rights through diversity of proceedings, such as the writ of 
mandamus, habeas corpus, habeas data (writ against legislative 
omission), class action and popular action45. This diversity of 
constitutional actions, which has the characteristic features of the 
diffused model and has been complemented by a variety of 
instruments aimed at exercising abstract judicial review by the 
                                                          
43 DANIEL H. FOOTE, LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT, 105 (2008). 
44 CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, 166 (2003). 
45 Gilberto Marcos Antonio Rodrigues, Marco Antonio Garcia Lopes 
Lorencini and Augusto Zimmermann, The Supreme Court of Brazil: 
Protecting Democracy and Centralized Power, in COURTS IN FEDERAL 
COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR UNITARISTS? 103, 125 (Nicholas 
Aroney and John Kincaid). 




Brazilian Supremo Federal Tribunal, such as the direct action of 
unconstitutionality includes due to omission, the declaratory action 
of constitutionality and complaint about non-compliance of 
fundamental precept46. The Federal Constitution establishes the 
original jurisdiction of the SFC.  It hears cases dealing with political 
crimes by ordinary appeals.  It hears certain writs by appeals in the 
event of denial by the Superior Court.  It can examine a 
fundamental precept derived from the Constitution when it does 
not comply.  The primary source of cases that reach SFC is through 
the extraordinary appellate jurisdiction.  This jurisdiction extends 
to (a) declaring an act contrary to a provision of the Constitution; 
(b) declaring a treaty or a federal law as one that violates the 
Constitution; (c) considering the validity of a law or act of a local 
government challenged under the Constitution; (d) considering the 
validity of a local law challenged in the light of a federal law. 
Further, many litigants try to enforce constitutional rights in their 
pleadings, which may end up in the SFC47.  The structure of the 
Court is composed of eleven Judges (Ministros)48.  
The Supreme Federal Court or Supremo Tribunal Federal must 
hear all cases that are appealed till 200449.  The Constitution (Forty-
fifth) Amendment in 2004 provides a new requirement to have the 
SFC to receive the appeal, i.e., the appellant must show the 
Repercussaogeral, i.e., the general repercussion of the constitutional 
problem before the SFC.  Under this rule, the SFC may refuse to 
hear a case, if a quorum of two-thirds of Justices agrees with it or 
through any procedure that has been defined by a Statute.  Before 
this amendment, in 1963 itself, they created a device called „Sumula 
of the Predominant Jurisprudence of the Supremo Tribunal 
Federal,‟ commonly known as Sumula.  The Sumula is just a one 
sentence declaration of the judgment of the Court, which states the 
interpretation of rules and the Constitution.  The Sumula prevents 
                                                          
46 CONSTITUIÇĂO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102§I cl.d 
(Braz.). 
47 Id.art.102 §III. 
48 Id. art. 101 
49 Tom S. Clark, Aaron B Strauss, The implications of High Court Docket 
Control for Resource Allocation and Legal Efficiency,22 [J] THEOR. POL., 247, 
248 (2010). 
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the Court from considering the cases of similar nature that burden 
the SFC.  The object of Sumula is to state the decisions of SFC on the 
most controversial questions over which the Court has already 
taken a firm position repeatedly.   Even though the Sumula is 
persuasive, it is understood to be an instrument to rationalize the 
internal proceedings and to access further to SFC jurisprudence.  
However, due to non-application of the principle of stare decisis, the 
sumula did not work properly, and the cases were overloaded in 
SFC on same legal issues which have been decided already50.  The 
issue relating to sumula was also addressed through the 45th 
amendment, where the amendment introduced the 
sumulavinculante (binding enouncement), i.e., application of the 
doctrine of precedent, which binds all judiciary and executive 
branches to a Supreme Court ruling, by filing a claim for failure to 
comply with its judgment51.   
After 2007, i.e., since the introduction of the 45th amendment, the 
number of cases filed and heard by the Court has substantially 
decreased.  From 2007 to 2008, there was 40.8% reduction in the 
number of cases accepted by the SFC, followed by a 36.1% falloff in 
2009. In 2010, the variation with 2009 was only 4.0%, which 
together with a 7.1% decrease in 2011, may indicate stabilization in 
the number of cases accepted, after the initial impact of the 
amendment concerned.  To put it plainly, the number of filings in 
2001 and 2002 were 110,771 and 160,453, respectively and 89,574 
and 87313 cases were accepted52.  The data shows that in 2010 and 
2011, the number of cases filed was 71,670 and 64,018 and in those, 
41,014 and 38,109 were taken up by the Court53.  Of late, the 
Brazilian Supreme Federal Court has been able to control the 
docket better than the past decade because of the adherence to the 
doctrine of precedent. 
                                                          
50 Maria Angela, Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian 
Supreme Federal Court: A Comparative Approach, 5WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. 
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51 Rodrigues et al., Supra note 45, at 115. 
52 Maria Angela, Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, NunoGaroupa, Stare 
Decisis and Certiorari Arrive to Brazil: A Comparative Law and Economics 
Approach, 26 EMORY INT‟L L. REV. 555 (2012). 
53 Id. at 569-70. 




IV.4  The Supreme Court of India  
The Supreme Court of India is at the apex of the judicial structure.  
Its jurisdictions are very wide and more potent than any other 
Court of a similar stature in any part of the world. It has original 
jurisdiction to decide both vertical and horizontal federal 
disputes54, enforcement of fundamental rights55, and to hear 
disputes regarding election of the President and Vice-president56.  It 
has appellate jurisdiction in civil and other matters when it 
involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the 
Constitution57. However, it has mandatory jurisdiction in criminal 
appeals when the High Court has confirmed the sentence of ten 
years or more58.  It exercises discretion under extraordinary 
appellate jurisdiction by granting special leave to appeal from any 
judgment or Order made by any court or tribunal59.  Further, it can 
do complete justice to the parties by its activist approach60.  It can 
review its judgments61 and also has the power to cure its Order 
under certain circumstances62.  It can tender advice to the head of 
the State on the question of law or fact63.  The jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is not the same as it was at the time of its inception.  
Like U.S., it has undergone certain changes periodically.  Besides 
the Court‟s expansion of its jurisdiction by its activist approach, the 
Parliament also extended by providing appeal remedy from the 
Tribunal or Commission by enacting specific Statutes64.There are 
almost twenty Parliamentary Statutes which provide appeal 
directly to the Supreme Court from the Tribunal or Commission by 
ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court. For instance, the appeal 
against the Order of the Appellate Tribunal of the Competition Act, 
                                                          
54 INDIA CONST. art. 131. 
55 Id. art. 32. 
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57 Id. arts. 132, 133, 134 §1 
58 Id.art. 134 §2. 
59 Id. art. 136. 
60 Id. art. 142. 
61 Id. art. 137. 
62 Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388.See The Supreme 
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Companies Act, the Pension Fund Regulatory, and Development 
Authority Act; Judgment or Order from the Contempt of Courts 
Act, Consumer Protection Act and Special Court from Trial of 
offences relating to Transactions in Securities Act do not require 
sanction or leave of that particular Commission, Tribunal and Court 
to file an appeal to the Supreme Court and they can file their appeal 
to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. The burgeoning 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been addressed in Gujarat 
Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Limited65.In this case, the Court 
observed that conferring direct appeals to the Supreme Court by 
excluding the High Court may affect the balance required to be 
maintained by the highest Court of giving priority to cases of 
national importance, for which larger benches may be necessary to 
be constituted.  The Court directed the Law Commission to look 
into the matter with the involvement of all the stakeholders and 
requested to report possibly within one year and listed the matter 
in November 2017 before a suitable three-Judge Bench66.   
The Law Commission of India promptly submitted its report67 
within one year i.e. Oct. 27, 2017.  The Commission opined that the 
object of establishing Tribunal is to reduce the burden of Courts 
particularly the High Court.  The Commission strongly viewed that 
every order arising from the Tribunal or its appellate Tribunal 
attains finality.  The Commission has made two suggestions to free 
the burden of Supreme Court in hearing appeals directly from the 
Statutory Tribunals.  Firstly, the Statutes establishing Tribunal 
without providing any Appellate Tribunal, then the appeal from 
the Tribunal shall lie to the Division Bench of the High Court.  
Secondly, the Statutes providing for an appellate Tribunal to decide 
an appeal from the Tribunal, then the decision of such appellate 
Tribunal shall be treated on par with the High Court. In such 
circumstances, providing an appeal to the High Court against the 
decision of the Appellate Tribunal will defeat the purpose of 
                                                          
65 (2016) 9 SCC 103. 
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establishing Tribunals. Further, the Statute should not provide 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court, or with leave of the Tribunal, 
against the decision of the appellate Tribunal.  The decision of the 
Appellate Tribunal can be challenged before the Supreme Court 
only on the grounds of National or Public importance.68 
The Parliament has brought certain changes in the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court based on few Law Commission 
recommendations.  The pecuniary jurisdiction was removed in civil 
cases through the Constitution (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1970.  
Unfortunately, the Parliament passed Supreme Court (Enlargement 
of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 and extended the 
Criminal appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to the cases 
where a sentence of ten years or more has been imposed by way of 
punishment by the High Court under certain conditions. But, in all 
circumstances, the civil appeals outnumbered the criminal appeals 
regardless of the above amendments69.The Supreme Court also 
made some internal reforms in the original jurisdiction, i.e., 
enforcement of fundamental rights of a citizen.  It happened in 1987 
when Justice E.S. Venkataramiah in P.N. Kumar v. Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi70, referred the writ petitioner to High Court 
under Art. 226 and not to approach the Supreme Court directly 
under Article 32 stating the mounting arrears and regular filing of 
cases burdening the Supreme Court. It became a routine affair for 
the Supreme Court in relegating the writ petitioner to the High 
Court without analyzing whether any fundamental rights were 
violated or not71. Nevertheless, the significant number of the cases 
comes to the Supreme Court through the extraordinary appellate 
jurisdiction.  In 2014, 80% of the total docket of the Supreme Court 
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69 RAJEEV DHAVAN, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STRAIN – THE 
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70(1987) 4 SCC 609. 
71 For instance, Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, (1989) Supp (2) 
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has been occupied by the petitions under the Special Leave 
Jurisdiction72. 
The liberal attitude of the Supreme Court in exercising the 
discretionary power to entertain the cases under special leave 
jurisdiction was addressed before the two-Judge Bench of the 
Supreme Court in the case of Mathai @ Joby v. George and another73.  
The Division Bench observed that „the Supreme Court as the Apex 
Court in the country was meant to deal with important issues like 
constitutional matters, questions of law of public importance or 
where grave injustice had been done. It noted that if the Supreme 
Court entertains all kinds of sundry matters, it will soon be flooded 
with a huge amount of cases and will not be able to deal with 
important questions for which it was meant under the 
constitutional scheme74.  The Court held that the time has come 
authoritatively to lay down guidelines for the exercise of discretion 
judiciously and referred the matter to the Constitution Bench. In 
2016, the Constitution Bench75 refused to revisit the scope of Art. 
136 or lay down guidelines regulating the power.  The Court, after 
appraising various cases relating to the exercise of discretionary 
powers under Art.136, observed that no effort should be made to 
restrict the power of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 and ruled 
that there could not be a straitjacket approach in the exercise of 
discretionary powers under Art. 136 and it would vary from case to 
case.  
Unfortunately, the Indian Supreme Court has not undergone any 
major reforms as like U.S. and Brazil.  The Federal Apex Court in 
U.S. and Brazil had accepted certain reforms by the legislature 
either through Statutes or Constitutional amendment to enable the 
institution to have control over its dockets.  Moreover, the Courts 
themselves had brought certain internal changes, but the problem 
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persists both in India and Japan because of the lack of interest on 
the part of the legislature to bring reformative steps or inability of 
the Judges to apply certain doctrinal tools to reduce the caseloads.  
Nevertheless, the latter is in a better position than the former 
because the Supreme Court of Japan exercises its discretion 
sparingly in admitting the appeals. The Legislature as well as the 
Executive in India did not give due regard to the recommendations 
of the Law Commission of India.  The Law Commission had 
suggested to streamline the oral arguments similar to the model of 
U.S. Supreme Court76 and advised to utilize the services of retired 
judges,77 which is acknowledged in Indian Constitution78.The 
retired judges are assets because of their expertise in different 
litigations and experiences in the art of adjudication.  The services 
of retired judges can be used similar to the practice of „junior court‟ 
in U.S.  The Supreme Court of India is striving for paperless Court 
in the lines of U.S. Supreme Court, which is evident from the 
farewell speech of former CJI Hon‟ble Justice K.S. Khehar79.  If the 
Supreme Court can make the digitization of Courts a reality, then it 
would be a phenomenal achievement and as a result, the cases can 
be disposed in a swift manner. The Supreme Court of India can  
adopt the process and procedure similar to Brazil, in  delivering  
short judgments, focusing only on the facts at the backdrop of 
settled law and bring necessary amendments in the Supreme Court 
rules to make it legally binding.  This will save enormous time for 
the Court.  
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V. Feasibility of establishing NCA 
Many social litigation lawyers filed Public Interest Litigation 
(“PIL”) petitions in the Supreme Court itself to restructure it, not 
only to reduce the burden of the Court but also to make it 
appellant-friendly. In 2016, a PIL petition80 was filed in the 
Supreme Court for setting up of NCA with regional benches to act 
as the final Courts in the matter of criminal and civil cases, and the 
Supreme Court to act as a Constitutional Court.  It was filed based 
on the observation made by the Supreme Court‟s Constitution 
Bench in the case of Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India 
& Another81.In this case, Chief Justice Bhagwati, on behalf of the 
Constitution Bench, pointed out that „this Court was never 
intended to be a regular court of appeal against orders made by the 
lower Courts.  It was created as an Apex Court for the purpose of 
laying down the law for the entire country.‟ Further, the Hon‟ble 
Judge suggested that „it would be desirable to set up a NCA, which 
would be in a position to entertain appeals by special leave from 
the decisions of the High Courts and Tribunals in the country in 
civil, criminal, revenue and labor cases and so far as the present 
Apex Court is concerned, it should concern itself only with 
entertaining cases, involving questions of constitutional law and 
public importance‟82. 
The three-Judge Bench finally referred the PIL petition to a 
Constitution Bench after hearing the contentions of the learned 
amicus curiae, Shri K.K. Venugopal and the then Attorney General, 
Shri Mukul Rohatgi.  There are totally eleven questions framed by 
the Court for the consideration of the Constitution Bench83, in 
which six questions relate to the desirability and feasibility of 
setting up of NCA. They are: (1) Can the division of the Supreme 
Court into a Constitutional wing and an appellate wing be an 
answer to the problem? (2) Has the Supreme Court of India been 
exercising jurisdiction as an ordinary court of appeal on facts and 
law, in regard to routine cases of every description? (3) Is the huge 
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pendency of cases in the Supreme Court, caused by the Court not 
restricting its consideration, as in the case of the Apex Courts of 
other countries, to Constitutional issues, questions of national 
importance, differences of opinion between different High Courts, 
etc.? (4) Is there a need for having Courts of Appeal, with exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear and finally decide the vast proportion of the 
routine cases, as well as petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution? 
(5)  As any such proposal would need an amendment to the 
Constitution, would the theory of „basic structure‟ of the 
Constitution be violated? (6) In view of cases pending in various 
courts including the Supreme Court, would it not be the duty of the 
Supreme Court to examine through a Constitution Bench and to 
recommend its opinion to the Government on the proposal for 
establishing four Courts of Appeal, so that the Supreme Court may 
regain its true status as a Constitutional Court? 
It is significant to mention that the creation of NCA and conferring 
final appellate jurisdiction will not serve any purpose until the 
special leave jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is curtailed.  The 
majority of cases come under Special Leave Petition (“SLP”), and 
the Court takes more time in deciding the admission of SLP. 
Further, if the discretion is used compassionately by our Supreme 
Court after establishing NCA (presumably), then the NCA will 
become another High Court.  Further, the potential litigants will 
not stop with the NCA, they may go up to the Supreme Court to 
exhaust all the remedies available although they have no case on 
their side.  The establishment of the NCA is a cumbersome process 
and requires so many changes in the Constitution and the relevant 
Statutes concerned, which is difficult to achieve immediately. The 
determination of a Constitutional question is a delicate mechanism 
because each and every case, in one way or other touches on the 
fundamental rights, or arbitrariness of the Government violating 
equality, etc.  So, overlapping of jurisdiction may occur between 
the NCA and the Supreme Court.  In such circumstances, it is 
difficult to reconcile the powers and functions of the NCA and the 
Supreme Court.   




The comparability of the different constitutional systems is an 
interesting phenomenon.  It is evident from the above analysis that 
there cannot be any generalizations in designing a Court meant for 
constitutional review, and each Constitution has no single and best 
way to structure a Constitutional Court because the role depends 
on the political process underlying the construction of the 
Constitution and the legal culture behind it.  The examination of 
the various Apex Courts‟ provides insight as to how the Court 
addresses the problem of the litigation explosion and its various 
controlling measures.  The docket size among these Courts is 
astonishingly diverse because of the discretionary power of the 
Court in entertaining cases. In India, the Parliament and the 
Government turned a deaf ear to many of the recommendations of 
the Law Commission, which aimed to lessen the burden of the 
Supreme Court.  Nonetheless, they did certain piecemeal reform, 
such as abolition of the pecuniary jurisdiction in civil appeals.  
Further, it is expected that the Government would consider the 
suggestions of the 272th report of the Law Commission relating to 
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court from Statutory 
Tribunals and make necessary reforms.   
The Court also adopted certain internal changes under the purview 
of  Art. 32, and not under Art.136, which occupies 80% of the total 
docket. Of late, the creation of National Court of Appeal (NCA) has 
gained momentum, but it is not an appropriate remedy to break all 
shackles.  At present circumstances, the establishment of NCA is a 
Herculean task, which cannot be achieved shortly.  Nonetheless, 
the Court can bring internal reforms through its rulemaking power 
under Article 145 of the Constitution.  It can impose self-limitations 
in entertaining SLPs and streamline the oral arguments by 
stipulating the time as like U.S., and encourage the written 
arguments with the word limit, etc.  Further, they can screen the 
SLPs separately by utilizing the services of retired judges of the 
Supreme Court as like screening „Writ of Certiorari‟ by the Junior 
Court in U.S. Further, the Indian Supreme Court should adopt e-
filing in all its benches. Like Brazil, they can also adopt the method 
of „Sumula‟, to shorten their judgments and Orders when there is an 
established precedent available in that matter. To give preference to 




the Constitutional matters, the Supreme Court can have a 
permanent specialized division for constitutional adjudication by 
splitting the existing Court itself.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
requires a strong will to restructure itself without depending on the 
other organs. 
 
